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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
FARMERS GRAIN COOPERATIVE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.-
EARL FREDRICKSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
No. 8701 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the statement of facts set forth in ap-
pellant's brief, we think it only fair to add to that state-
ment the following: 
The respondent was required, under the terms of the 
mortgage to purchase from the appellant "all feed required 
by the mortgagor for the feeding of said turkeys." Pl. 
Exhibit No. 2, Par. Third and Sub-Par. 4, Fourth. The 
suit originated on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise sold. Subsequently an amended complaint 
was filed, based upon the contract of the parties, repre-
sented by a note and mortgage which was entirely devoid 
of any obligation on the part of the defendant to provide 
insurance on the turkeys. The only place in the negotia-
tions where any reference to insurance is made, is in de-
fendant's Exhibit No. 5, and the reference there is to fire 
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and storm insurance only. Plaintiff itself brought into the 
record the question of insurance, through its Exhibit No.3 
(ledger sheet) wherein appears a debit against the de-
fendant "INSURANCE $250.00" with no explanation 
whatsoever as to what kind of insurance was included in 
that debit. Plaintiff through its counsel interrogated 
its first witness in chief, concerning insurance, leaving 
the question wholly in doubt as to the nature and 
extent of insurance charged against the defendant. 
Throughout the transaction between the parties, the re-
cord is replete with evidence of inaccuracies or over-
charges made by plaintiff against the defendant. Every 
inaccuracy or overcharge was in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, and was never corrected until by 
accident, based upon meager accounts furnished defend-
ant, he discovered, even with his lack of knowledge of 
bookkeeping, that he was being overcharged and that 
errors were constantly creeping into the account. De-
fendant was never furnished at any time with any com-
plete account so that he could determine whether all of 
of the inaccuracies or overcharges were ever corrected. 
It should further be noted, that the defendant sub-
sequently remitted the difference between $3,500.00 al-
lowed him by the jury for excessive death of birds, and 
$1,698.00, which the evidence shows their value to be, 
rather than consented to it, and throughout the trial of 
the case, plaintiff itself including its final witness, brought 
into the record the question of insurance, and by its final 
witness, even brought out the question of liability insur-
ance and a discussion they had had out of Court with the 
defendant, concerning the possibility of him filing a claim 
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with the Casualty Company; notwithstanding all that, the 
Court instructed the jury that so far as it was concerned, 
there was no question of insurance in the case, and even if 
there was, it should have no bearing on their decision. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY THE INFERENCE THAT THE FEED 
WAS DEFICIENT AND PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
DEFENDANT'S DAMAGES. THE COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF CERTAIN 
TESTIMONY. 
POINT NO. II. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PRE-
JUDICED BY DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO GET 
THE QUESTION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
BEFORE THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The evidence was sufficient to justify the inference 
that the feed was deficient and proximately caused de-
fendant's damages. The Court did not err in admission 
of certain testimony. 
The record will reveal that every poult from both 
hatches from which defendant's birds were taken was 
accounted for. Not only the poult supplier, but each pur-
chaser of poults from both hatches as well, testified as to 
condition of his poults at the time of delivery and mode 
of transportation to point of delivery as a precaution 
against the plaintiff testifying that all poults or at least 
some of them were weak at delivery or that mode of trans-
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:'0rtation of defendant's poults, or weather conditions, 
or some other extraneous condition might have injured or 
weakened the defendant's poults. 
The testimony concerning the brooding and ranging 
was all to the effect that conditions under which defendant 
brooded and ranged his poults were at least equal, if not 
superior, to conditions of the growers of the remainder 
of the batches from which defendant's poults came. The 
witness H. J. Bonie was an expert in selling and servicing, 
including brooding and ranging and had handled between 
seven or eight million birds over a period of 20 years. His 
testimony with respect to the conditions under which all of 
the poults from the two batches from which defendant's 
turkeys came will be found on Pages ( 48, Howard Green; 
49, LeGrande Anderson; 50, Keith Jacobs and Edmond 
Bell; and defendant Fredrickson Page 51) T. 
The witness said, that all of the turkeys, including 
defendant's were in good condition when delivered (T. 
51 ) ; that brooding conditions for the defendant's poults 
were ideal ( T. 54 L. 7), and that the brooding conditions 
used by all the purchasers were conducive to bring about 
the same results as the brooder conditions of defendant 
(T. 56 L. 11-22 ), and that defendant's poults were the 
only ones fed on feeds furnished by the plaintiff (T. P. 
44-56), and that only turkeys from the hatches in question 
from which normal, or better than normal, results were 
not obtained were the poults fed on plaintiffs feeds 
(T. 57). 
It will be noted that the witness Bonie, has been 
engaged in the hatching, selling, servicing and purchasing 
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of turkeys over a period of 20 years constantly, and had 
delivered seven or eight million of such birds, and had 
watched them and the manner in which they were brooded 
and ranged constantly, and certainly was an expert in his 
field. 
The testimony of Mr. Bonie, whose reputation as an 
expert was not questioned, was to the effect that while 
there are some dissimilarities in methods used by the 
several purchasers of these broods, yet each method used 
was a recognized method to bring about favorable results 
in the brooding and growing of turkeys, and there is no 
evidence to the contrary (T. 54-55-56). The plaintiff 
having required that defendant purchase all his feed from 
plaintiff, warranted the results to be obtained through 
the use of its feeds, not only that but the kind and amount 
of feeds to be consumed to bring about favorable results 
(Defendant's Exhibit No.7). This evidence is uncontra-
dicted and there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record, 
that the conditions under which defendant's poults were 
brooded, colonized and ranged were not ideal. Plaintiff 
offered none, and did not even question the conclusion 
of defendant's witness that they were ideal. The appellant 
by its own evidence showed that its representatives 
were in attendance of the defendant's flock of turkeys 
frequently, and certainly had every opportunity to observe 
all of th~ conditions surrounding the brooding and ranging 
of the flock and no objections to any of the conditions were 
ever noted. We think a fair conclusion to be reached 
from all of the evidence, is that after defendant's birds 
began dying excessively and they were dissected at the 
Utah State University by Dr. Miner, that plaintiff through 
its representative, Leonard, refused to follow the advise 
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and recommendations of Dr. Miner, but assumed on his 
own the feeding of terramyacin to the poults for at least 
a week after Dr. Miner recommended placing the poults 
on a milk diet to compensate for a Vitamin "B" deficiency 
(De£' s. Ex. No. 8), and under defendant's contract with 
plaintiff, he had no choice but to follow the directions of 
the plaintiff. (Pl. Ex. No. 2). 
The testimony of Grant F. White, who has for several 
years grown turkeys in the vicinity of defendant's range, 
and who from his testimony, is an extremely well exper-
ienced turkey grower (T. 188-190) testified that the 
brooding facilities of defendant's poults were as good, 
or better than the witness' facilities (T. 190). That the 
year in question, his turkeys were ranged within a mile 
and a half of defendant's range; that the conditions of 
defendant's range was better for that purpose than the 
witness' range ( T. 191); further, that the witness' mortal-
ity rate for brooding for 1953 was less than 4%. That his 
hen turkeys at the end of 23 weeks ran 12 lbs. and 13 lbs. 
at the end of 24 weeks, and the toms between 22 lbs and 
23 lbs. for the same time, (T. 192); that malnutrition 
during brooding, 
"Naturally slows the growth of that turkey down. 
It would take a longer period for a turkey that has 
been stunted to grow to a prime bird than it would 
a healthy bird." (T. 193). 
A fair resume of the testimony concerning the nutri-
tion deficiency in the feeds is as follows: Wilson, one of 
plaintiff's dealers, testified that the pellets were too large 
and un-uniform in size; that the plaintiff's method of mak-
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ing pellets and crumbles was likely to result in a loss of 
vitamins through repeated heating without use of a gela-
tin covered vitamin, which they did not use. (T. 203 ). 
Wilson testified that other complaints came to the com-
pany concerning their feeds (T. 204) and that he was 
called into their Ogden Plant to assist in overcoming the 
trouble they were experiencing (T. 205) (fines and 
lumps). Hodges testified that crumbles were un-uniform 
in size, and were too large and that the poults would not 
and could not eat them; hence, they became stale, the 
young poults became uneasy, commenced chirping and 
picking the vents of each other, commonly called canni-
balism, commencing about a week after he received the 
poults and just prior to the time when excessive deaths 
resulted (T. 173-175). 
Dr. Miner, the veterinarian from the Utah State Uni-
versity, testified that vitamin deficiency usually results 
in the picking of vents (T. 219-230) and answering to the 
hypothetical question testified that nutritive deficiency in 
the feeds usually shows up in the health of the poults after 
about 10 days to 2 weeks (T. 230), and the evidence 
shows that the excessive death rate commenced about 10 
days after the first delivery of poults, and after being put 
on plaintiff's feeds. It is pertinent to note, that the con-
tract between the parties (Pl. Ex. No. 2), required de-
fendant, 
"To keep the poults properly fed, housed and cared 
for 0 according to required and approved methods 
and purchase all the feed from plaintiff or follow 
their directions." (Pl. Ex. No. 2, Sub. 5 of Par. 
Fourth.) 
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All of the testimony in the record is to the effect that 
they were housed and cared for according to required 
and approved methods. There is no evidence to the con-
trary. That datnages and the inference as to the proximate 
cause of damages may be shown by comparison with the 
other flocks was determined by this Court in the leading 
Utah case, Park vs. Moorman Mfg. Co., ( 241 P 2d, 914, 
Syllibus No. 10 on P. 920), wherein this Court said: 
"Appellant further contends that the evidence in this 
case is insufficient to justify the inference that plain-
tiff's loss was the proximate result of the use of either 
the feed or the method of feeding or both. The 
record contains testimony of defendant's own veterin-
arian that the feed or plan could have caused plain-
tiff's loss. There was further testimony of other 
witnesses who had used the feed and had had un-
desirable results. The inference drawn by officers of 
plaintiff company and by buyers from plaintiff that 
the chickens on plaintiff's feed and plan were far 
below the chickens on the other plan, and that 
such condition came· within a significant period after 
defendant's feed and plan were adopted is further 
evidence of proximate cause. This question of prox-
imate cause is likewise a jury question. Taking the 
evidence most favorable to the defendant, there is 
substantial evidence established by the record to sup-
port the jury's implied finding as to proximate cause 
of the loss." 
This Court has also substantiated inference through 
the elimination of other possible causes in Andreason vs. 
Industrial Commission, (98 Utah 551; 100 P. 2d, 202). 
There is no evidence in the instant case upon which any 
inference could be made other than that the excessive 
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losses suffered by the defendant, came from a nutritional 
deficiency and the wrongful use of anti-biotics. Every 
other possible cause was eliminated insofar as the poults 
themselves and the housing and methods of caring for 
them was concerned, and plaintiff offered no evidence to 
the contrary. 
The amount of the Judgment is not in question in 
this case. The only question with respect to damages 
raised, is that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant 
any damages. 
An analysis of the hypothetical question put to Dr. 
Miner, beginning Line 19, P. 229 Tr., fairly sums up the 
evidence ellicited from the witness Bonie, and the other 
purchasers of these poults and the witness White, as to 
all the conditions of the poults when received, and the 
conditions under which they were brooded and ranged, 
and the results obtained. If by that method all other 
causes or inferences other than nutritional deficiences 
were eliminated, based upon the facts in the case, then 
certainly the hypothetical question and the foundation 
laid is sufficient and proper. We are not advised of any 
conditions set forth in the question which is not substant-
iated by the evidence already in the record. Certainly 
plaintiff in its brief does not call attention to any assumed 
facts not in the evidence upon which its objection to the 
question was made. 
It should further be noted that the only objection 
made to the question was whether or not the witness had 
an opinion as to cause. The objection was overruled -
the witness answered yes. Next question: 
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"What is your opinion, Dr.?" and there was no ob-
jection to that. (T. 230). 
Plaintiff sets out on Page 8 of its brief that on cross-
examination the witness, Dr. Miner, stated in his report 
that nutritive conditions are the result of perhaps one of 
four reasons which are: 
1. Insufficient intake of food; 
2. Lack of proper nutrients in the feed; 
3. Interference of absorption of nutrients in the in-
testinal tract by chemicals or bacterial growth; and 
4. That the nutrients were in a form not readily 
utilized. 
An analysis of the evidence shows that ( 1) because 
the pellets and crumbles were too large and un-uniform in 
size that the poults could not and did not eat them, and 
they were left to become stale in the feeders; hence, in-
sufficient intake of food. Dr. Miner's report, defendants 
Ex. No. 8, shows ( 2) a lack of proper nutrients in the feed, 
and a milk diet was recommended. Dr. Miner's report 
shows ( 3 ) there was no bacterial growth in the intestines 
in the poults dissected by him which would cause any 
trouble, and ( 4) the crumbles and pellets, being too large 
and not uniform in size is conclusive evidence that they 
were in such form that they could not be readily utilized-
so <:>very point raised by the doctor is apparently favorable 
to the defendant, and a sufficient answer to the hypo-
thetical question propounded to him. 
We are unable to see where plaintiff receives any 
comfort from its Citation of Authorities, from 66 A.L.R. 
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86 since it seems to us from a reading of the annotation~ 
that the same is not in point and refers vaguely, if at all, 
to a situation such as the case here, and many of the cases 
cited therein are actually against Plaintiff's conclusion and 
in favor of the conclusion reached by the learned trial 
Court here, in admitting the evidence complained of. 
(Winter-Loeb Grocery Company vs. Boiken, 203 Atlanta 
187-82 Southern 437) (Said cases from 82 to 86, and 92 
to 96 inclusive) ( 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 308, P. 286). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
The plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendant's at-
tempt to get the point of insurance coverage before the 
jury. 
The question of insurance was introduced to the jury 
by the plaintiff itself. An examination of the record re-
veals that the question of insurance was not inadvertently 
brought in as a part of the plaintiff's case, but was coB-
sciously and intentionally brought in and the manner in 
which it was brought in and pursued by plaintiff counsel 
could hardly have any effect, except to infer and lead 
the jury to believe that any loss in the raising of these 
turkeys sustained by the defendant Fredrickson was cov-
ered by insurance to him. 
Exhibit No. 3, offered by plaintiff through its wit-
ness Young, includes the following item: 
"V1825 INSURANCE $250.00." 
Counsel for plaintiff on direct examination asked the 
following questions and ellicited the following answers: 
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"Q. Will you please explain this ledger sheet in con-
nection with these papers in Exhibit Four? Do you have, 
in those papers that are part of Exhibit Four, an invoice 
that corresponds with each entry on your ledger sheet? 
A. I think with one exception. 
Q. What would that exception be? 
A. That was the INSURANCE PREMIUM paid on 
it. (Caps ours). 
Q. And there is a copy of the original document in 
the record for that, is there not? 
A. There's a copy of the invoice. Not of the 
voucher." 
Mr. Huggins stated that he did not get the exception 
noted about the insurance premium, and Mr. Olson stated 
that he said that an original of the invoice for each of 
the entries is here except the one for the INSURANCE 
PREMIUM (Caps ours), of which there was a copy of 
the invoice, but not of the voucher (T. 10-11). So that, 
plaintiff having introduced a charge against the defen-
ant which was not included in the contract between the 
parties (PI's. Ex. No.2), defendant was entitled to know 
as a part of the account charged against him, what the 
particular items therein noted were for, since there was 
no reference in the contract or mortgage that insurance 
was chargeable against the defendant. Defendant's coun-
sel had no alternative but to determine whether it was a 
proper charge against his client, the defendant; partic-
ularly in view of the otl1er overcharges made, and certainly 
the defendant was not examined or interrogated to any 
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greater extent about that item than any other item in the 
account. On cross examination the plaintiff's witness 
Young was asked: 
"Q. Do you know what that charge amounted to? 
A. $3,675.00. 
Q. Now, was that the only amount in your Exhibit 
No. 1 in addition to the cost of feed? 
A. I believe that's correct, sir. The INSURANCE, 
AS I REMEMBER, IS ALSO INCLUDED THERE. 
(Volunteered) (Caps ours). 
Q. Do you know how much the insurance was? 
A. $250.00. 
Q. And what does that represent, Mr. Young? 
A. That was insurance against loss by various con-
tingencies stipulated in the policy. Fire principally. 
Q. On the Fredrickson turkeys? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, that was insurance you had pur-
chased to cover any losses you might sustain? 
A. HE might sustain. (Meaning the defendant) 
(Caps ours). 
Q. That came from fire or theft OR ANY OTIIER 
CASUALTY? (Caps ours). 
A. Well, that would be mentioned on the insurance 
policy, I cannot tell you exactly." T. P. 12-13). 
It will be noted that the insurance policy was not 
offered in evidence to show what coverage it included, 
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and hence, the only way defendant could determine that 
fact, and whether it was a proper charge against him, 
was by interrogating the witness who did know, on cross 
examination, just exactly what kind of insurance plaintiff 
had injected into the case, under circumstances highly pre-
judicial to the said defendant. Since insurance on the 
defendant's turkeys had been placed before the jury by 
plaintiff, defendant had no alternative but to refute the 
implication in plaintiff's testimony, that if plaintiff re-
covered its judgment against the defendant, the defendant 
was insured to cover his loss. It is rather an anomaly that 
the plaintiff finds itself in this Court to defend itself 
against a prejudicial error created by plaintiff itself. It 
is axiomatic: "A party who participates in or contributes 
to an error, cannot complain of it." McDonald vs. McNidt 
(Mont.) 206 P. 1096; 5 C.J.S.; P. 173 Section 1501; Mc-
Kinney vs. Red Top Cab Co. (Cal.) 299 P. 113. See also 
Nobel vs. Miles, et ux, 19 P. 2d. P. 296, wherein the Su-
preme Court of California clearly and succinctly states 
the rule as follows: 
"(7-10) The rule is firmly established by numerous 
decisions that parties must abide by the consequences 
of their own acts and cannot seek a reversal of the 
case for error which they invited. In other words, 
one who by his own conduct invites error is 
estopped afterwards from complaining of the pre-
judicial effect flowing therefrom. (2 Cal. Jur. 846, 
848 ;Seale vs. Garr, 155 Cal. 577, 102 P. 262)." 
All references to insurance by the defendant were 
directed at determining whether the item shown in plain-
tiffs Exhibit No. 3 was a proper charge against the de-
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fendant, and no one mentioned INSURANCE ON FEED 
except the plaintiffs witness Young, WHO VOLUN-
TEERED the information: (Caps ours). 
"I think we are insured for any damages which may 
arise for defective feed. I have never seen that policy 
but I am sure we have such a policy." (T. 24). 
It will be noted that at no time did the defendant 
ask the question of any witness whether there was any 
insurance covering casualty from defective feed. De-
fendant's Exhibit No. 5 which is not a part of the contract, 
is a request on the part of the plaintiff that the turkeys 
"be protected by fire and storm insurance." Any in-
quiry by defendant's counsel concerning the insurance 
premium charged against the defendant was propounded 
to determine whether that premium included other in-
surance than that which the letter indicates. 
Plaintiff again brought in the question of insurance 
by its own question, ( T. P. 24 L. 28) : 
"Q. Well, for instance, on the insurance Mr. Huggins 
was asking you about. You actually paid a $250.00 
premium for him to some company? 
A. That was for insurance on his particular lot of 
turkeys." 
Mr. Olson again referred to the question of insurance, 
(T. 27 L. 1): 
"Q. And then the insurance would be another item 
that you'd paid cash out for? 
A. Yes, sir." 
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Throughout the case only one objection to the ques-
tion of insurance was made by plaintiffs counsel (T. 24). 
However plaintiff reintroduced the question of insurance 
through its witness Leonard, as follows, by Mr. Stine: 
"Q. Was any further discussion had at that time? 
A. He brought up the various factors mentioned, if 
there couldn't have been an error in our books or an error 
somewhere along the line in the amount of feed consumed 
and various phases of that. We were still trying to find 
out what might have happened, and in the meantime he 
had just come from Wilfred Young's office over in the main 
building and advised me that Wilfred Young had told 
him that we were insured in regards to trouble that might 
occur from the use of our feed. Therefore, he was wonder-
ing if it wouldn't be wise to enter a claim against the in-
surance company and settle the thing up. 
Q. Any further conversation take place? 
A. I told him that if his claim substantiated the 
facts in the case, I agreed with him heartily, that at the 
time I doubted very much that he had a claim that would 
hold up. I advised against such practice. 
Q. And what did you say to him as regards the 
merits of the claim? 
A. I told him I doubted very much that he'd be able 
to prove that the feed was insufficient, a deficiency. 
Strictly my own opinion. I told him it was strictly my 
own opinion, but I would hesitate to go ahead and spend 
a lot of money until I was pretty sure." (Tr. 358-359). 
So, not only did the plaintiff introduce the question 
of insurance initially, but pursued the question per-
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sistently to the conclusion of the case, when it would be 
most likely to be remembered by the jury, and it is con-
ceivable that there might have been a definite purpose 
in getting the question of insurance, casualty and liability 
insurance before the jury at this stage of the trial. A close 
analysis of all of the evidence concerning insurance 
shows that defendant did not bring the question of 
insurance to the attention of the jury, but that plain-
tiff itself introduced the subject and persisted in fol-
lowing through. 
In any event, the learned trial Court overcame plain-
tiff's introduction of the question of insurance, by instruct-
ing the jury that so far as the Court was aware there was 
no insurance involved in this case, but even if there was, 
it should have nothing to do with their decision in the 
case (Instructions No. 14). 
There is nothing in this record to show that any re-
ference to insurance had any effect upon the verdict. 
American Jurisprudence, Page 591 of Section 1034 
shows: 
"Only a few courts go to the extreme of holding that 
the mere mention of insurance in the course of the 
trial is so prejudicial as to require reversal. In general 
however, the burden is on the party INDUCING 
THE ADMISSION OF SUCH EVIDENCE to re-
move a possible prejudice 0 " (Plaintiff introduced 
the question. ) (Caps ours). 
"o The general view, however, is that error in intro-
ducing in evidence the fact that the defendant in a 
negligence case is insured may be cured by proper 
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instructions directing the jury to disregard the matter, 
particularly if it can be said that the verdict was not 
affected thereby." 
"o Likewise, even though the testimony is improper 
when it originally comes into the case, there is no 
reversible error if the fact of insurance is subsequently 
made properly to appear in the trial. See also 5 C.J.S. 
173: Sec. 1501." 
All of the evidence, except that which was volun-
teered by plaintiffs own witness Leonard, is to the effect 
that the only insurance amounted to fire insurance on the 
turkeys themselves. 
We agree with plaintiffs counsel that none of the 
cases on the question of insurance cited by them in its 
Brief, pages 12 and 13, are exactly in point to the instant 
case - in fact, we go further than that - that in our opin-
ion, they have no bearing on this case whatsover as a 
careful reading of the cases will indicate. 
In Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179; 17 P. 2d, 224, where 
counsel for plaintiff interrogated a prospective juror con-
cerning the question of liability insurance, this Court 
cautioned against the unguarded efforts to get such ques-
tion before the jury, as folows: 
"In negligence cases where defendant has liability 
insurance it is required that questions to prospective 
jurors be carefully safeguarded. Protection of parties' 
rights is within the Judge's wise discretion. (Syllibus 
4) ." 
In the case of Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d 392; 
284 P. 2d, 1115 the question involved was whether an 
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admission by the defendant that he had liability coverage 
was competent to prove an admission of liability. 
In Ried vs. Owens, 98 Utah 50; 93 Pac. 2d, 680, the 
question involved was whether it was error to admit 
testimony of defendant concerning knowledge of his son's 
careless driving and the providing of insurance to guard 
against the consequences of it, as an admission of liability 
or responsibility. We find nothing in this case which has 
any bearing upon the instant case. 
Mter citing rules of evidence in other Courts, this 
Court said: 
"These rules are all wise precautionary measures to 
prevent the introduction in evidence of immaterial 
and irrevelant but highly prejudicial adversions to 
liability insurance." 
The case of Morrison vs. Peery, cited by appellant, 
104 Utah 139; 122 Pac. 2d, 191, makes no allusion to in-
surance whatsoever, in the main opinion. There is a dis-
sent by Justice Wolfe which did not become the opinion 
of the Court in which there is some discussion of insurance 
but it has no bearing on this case whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted therefore, that a careful 
analysis and appraisal of all the testimony in this case 
could lead to no other conclusion but that the excessive 
mortality of the defendant's poults and their failure to ma-
ture properly within a normal range of the time, and with 
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normal amounts of feed was proximately caused by the 
defective feed furnished to defendant by plaintiff as 
follows: . 
1. Vitamin "B" deficiency in the starter mash. 
2. Deficiency of intake by reason of the oversize and 
irregular sized crumbles, further aggravated by the use of 
terramyacin against the doctors instructions, and at the 
insistence of the plaintiff. 
Further, plaintiff cannot recover now, a reversal of 
the judgment based upon the consequences of its own 
actions in introducing and pursuing the question of in-
surance. 
Further, there is no claim made, and certainly none 
could be made fairly from the evidence, that the judgment 
entered by the Court, under all the circumstances, is not 
fair and just. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS, 
By IRA A. HUGGINS, and 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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